This paper addresses the role of race in forecasts of failure on probation or parole. Failure is defined as committing a homicide or attempted homicide or being the victim of a homicide or an attempted homicide. These are very rare events in the population of individuals studied, which can make these outcomes extremely difficult to forecast accurately. Building in the relative costs of false positives and false negatives, machine learning procedures are applied to construct useful forecasts. The central question addressed is what role race should play as a predictor when as an empirical matter the majority of perpetrators and victims are young, African-American, males.
Introduction
The role of race in criminal justice processes and outcomes has long been of interest to social scientists. Among the many issues addressed are racial profiling (Grogger and Ridgeway, 2006; Alpert et al., 2007) , charging discrimination in capital cases (Baldus et al., 1990; Klein et al., 2006) , racial disparities in sentencing (Blumstein et al, 1983: Chapter 2), and the consequences of racial disproportionality in prison populations (Blumstein, 1993; Western, 2007) . One of the reasons this large literature has continued to grow is that isolating the role of race can be very difficult. Many of the problems have been recognized for decades (Klepper et al., 1983) , and new problems continue to surface (Berk et al., 2005) .
In this paper, we consider the role of race in forecasts of failure on probation or parole. This application has several novel features. First, failure is defined as committing a homicide or attempted homicide or being the victim of a homicide or an attempted homicide. These are very rare events within typical populations of offenders under supervision. Studies of parole or probation outcomes have typically been concerned with any failures, from technical violations to the the most serious crimes (Berk, 2008b; Berk et al., 2009 ). These are not rare events. Second, true forecasts, not the conventional measures of fit, will be reported. Forecasting accuracy is the appropriate way to evaluate risk assessments of future behavior. Moreover, the results will closely approximate how the predictions would fare in practice. Finally, the forecasts are a product of statistical learning procedures (Berk, 2008a ) that introduce some new issues to the debates about the role of race in crime and justice.
Background
Decisions about whether to place a convicted offender on probation or to put a prison inmate on parole have been informed by empirical risk assessments since the 1920s (Berk, 2008b) . Even when explicit forecasts of behavior are not made, these risk assessments have necessarily been forward looking. The empirical question has been how will a particular individual behave if placed under supervision in the community. Risk assessments used in probation and parole decisions have been forecasts even when not labeled as such.
However, it is very difficult to determine how accurate even more recent risk assessments have been (Farrington, 1987) . One of the key problems, long recognized but rarely addressed, is that risk assessments have usually been "validated" with the very same data used to construct the risk instrument (Ohlin and Duncan, 1949; Goodman, 1953a; 1953b) . Overly optimistic evaluations of forecasting accuracy can follow. If you want to know how accurately a risk assessment instrument forecasts future behavior, make real forecasts and see. Making forecasts into the data used to build the forecasting procedure does not really qualify. It is a bit like looking at all of the face down cards before placing a bet.
Despite little hard evidence on how well probation and parole risk assessments forecast, there has been of late growing interest in such forecasts to help inform decisions about whom to release into the community and the conditions of their supervision (Berk et al., 2009 ). One reason is that at fiscally difficult times, forecasts of behavior under supervision in principle can be used to better allocate scarce supervisory resources. Another reason is that new developments in statistics and computer science may help to reduce forecasting errors, especially for the commission of violent crimes that so roil the politics of criminal justice. With better forecasts, a greater number of these violent crimes perhaps could be prevented.
It is in this context that the analyses to be discussed were undertaken for a state department of probation and parole. The department already had acceptably accurate risk assessment protocols for probation or parole failures involving any new arrest. However, there was a keen interest in developing special forecasting procedures for individuals who commit a homicide or attempted homicide or who are the victim of a homicide or attempted homicide. Anecdotal evidence suggested that homicide perpetrators and victims were largely the same kinds of offenders, at least among this population of parolees or probationers. The primary goal was to reduce the number of homicides to which they were a party. The forecasts would be used primarily to determine the conditions imposed, the nature of the supervision, and the services to be provided. There was no intent to use the forecasts to inform decisions about whether to parole an inmate or to place a convicted offender on probation.
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Predictors were to come from the official data sets that would ordinarily be available when important supervisory decisions were made. Included among the potential predictors were several fixed attributes -race, gender, and age -that could be seen as identifying a protected group. In addition, there was information on the zipcode area into which an individual would be released. In locales with substantial residential segregation, knowing the zipcode is virtually the same as knowing an individual's race. There were also concerns that individuals living in certain neighborhoods could be penalized 1 Using forecasts derived from the experiences of individuals under supervision in the community to inform release decision is tricky. The populations involved are somewhat different. The population for parole decisions is prison inmates. The population for probation release is convicted offenders at sentencing. The forecasts sought in this study were for a population of individuals already under supervision. Ideally, no illegitimate predictors would be used to construct the forecasts. But there was also a keen desire to make the forecasts as accurate as possible. In this state, most of the violence was to be found in large urban areas where both perpetrators and victims were largely young, black men. Yet, using age, race and gender could be seen by some stakeholders as inappropriate and even illegal. At the same time, a failure to use those predictors risked less accurate forecasts and a substantial number of homicides that might otherwise have been prevented. This is a tension to which we will return later.
Fail

Data
A decision was made to focus initially on a single large urban area responsible for a large fraction of the state's homicides and where there was great political pressure to "do something." In addition, working within one urban area was thought to improve the quality of the forecasts. If, for example, urban, suburban, and rural areas were included, the forecasting task might be substantially more difficult. The etiology of homicide could vary by locale so that predictors that were effective in on setting might be ineffective in another.
All of the individuals who were under supervision in 2006 were to be used as the population. There were 11,157 such cases. The 2006 cohort was chosen to allow for an 18 month follow-up in the official data, and there was no reason to believe that the 2006 cohort was materially different from cohorts as much 10 years earlier, or would be materially different from cohorts 5 to 10 years into the future. The working data set was assembled from several sources and merged with identification numbers unique for each individual. Table 1 shows a cross-tabulation of race by whether or not an individual failed on probation or parole. Less than 2% of the individuals failed. About half of the failures were for committing a homicide or attempted homicide. Of the remaining failures, approximately three-fourths were non-fatal victimizations and approximately one-fourth were fatal victimizations.
About 85% of the probationers or parolees were African-American and about 14% were white. The rest were approximately evenly divided between Native-Americans and Asians, but their numbers were small and for purposes of Table 1 collapsed into "Other." Because the focus is on race, Hispanics are not broken out. But in this city, they are relatively few and are typically counted as White. Table 1 also makes clear that even though failures were rare, they were most common among African-American offenders. For Whites, 3.8 probationers or parolees failed for every 1000 individuals under supervision. For Blacks, 20.2 probationers or parolees failed for every 1000 individuals under supervision. The failure rate for Blacks is about 5 times greater. Blacks were far more likely to commit murder or attempted murder and were also far more likely to be victimized by them.
Constructing Useful Forecasts
Useful forecasts could not be constructed by conventional regression methods. One obstacle was that the relative costs of forecasting errors needed to be taken into account. A second obstacle was that no credible forecasting model was available a priori, and past work had suggested that the usual regression functional forms were not likely to be appropriate (Berk et al., 2009) .
2 A third obstacle was that with forecasting accuracy the primary goal, the statistical procedures employed should concentrate on forecasting skill. Conventional regression models treat forecasting as an afterthought. For these reasons, more thoroughly discussed shortly, we applied the statistical learning procedure random forests (Breiman, 2001a) .
For a categorical response variable such as failure on probation or parole, random forests proceeds sequentially in the following manner.
1. From a data set with N observations, a probability sample of size n is drawn with replacement.
2. Observations not selected are retained as the out-of-bag (OOB) data that can serve as test data that tree. Usually, about a third of the observations will be OOB.
3. A random sample of predictors is drawn from the full set that is available. For technical reasons that are beyond the scope of this paper (Breiman, 2001 ), the sample is typically small (e.g., 3 predictors). The number of sampled predictors is a tuning parameter, but the usual default values for determining the predictor sample size seems to work quite well in practice.
4. Classification and Regression Trees (CART) is applied (Breiman et al., 1984) to obtain the first partition of the data.
5. Steps 3 and 4 are repeated for all subsequent partitions until further partitions do not improve the model's fit. The result for a categorical outcome is a classification tree.
6. Each terminal node is assigned a class in the usual CART manner. In the simplest case, the class assigned is the class with the greatest number of observations. 7. The OOB data are dropped down the tree, and each observation is assigned the class associated with the terminal node in which that observation falls. The result is the predicted class for each OOB observation for a given tree.
8. Steps 1 through 7 are repeated a large number of times to produce a large number of classification trees. The number of trees is a tuning parameter, but the results are usually not very sensitive for any number of trees of 500 or more.
9. For each observation, classification is by majority vote over all trees for which that observation was OOB.
No classifiers to date consistently classify and forecast more accurately than random forests (Breiman, 2001a; Berk, 2008a) . Scholastic gradient boosting (Friedman, 2002) would probably do about as well, but for classification problems has not yet the capacity to take the costs of forecasting errors formally into account.
Addressing The Costs of Forecasting Errors Within Random Forests
Because (thankfully) failures are very rare, it is difficult to construct accurate forecasts that take predictors into account. If one just forecasted no failure all the time, one would be correct in approximately 98 of 100 cases. It is hard to imagine a conventional regression model (e.g., logistic regression) that could do better.
3 Yet, no high risk individuals would be identified even though this could have significant costs. In other words, it is difficult to forecast more accurately than by relying solely on the marginal distribution of the outcome, but then all failures would automatically become costly false negatives. The costs of false positives -incorrectly forecasting a failureshould be factored in as well.
Conventional regression models assume symmetric costs. For this application, symmetric costs means that the cost of incorrectly forecasting no failure (i.e., false negatives) would be treated the same as the costs of incorrectly forecasting a failure (i.e., false positives). Yet, it was readily apparent to stakeholders that the costs of false negatives were significantly greater than the costs of false positives. The major cost of false positives was providing supervision and services that were not formally required. Yet, it was also possible that those resources would prevent other serious crimes. The major cost of false negatives was homicides or attempted homicides.
Random forests can respond to the relative costs of false positives and false negatives. One approach, in effect, alters the prior distribution of the response variable with each pass through the data, which translates into adjustments for relative costs (Breiman et al., 1984: 115) . When the data are sampled prior to the construction of each classification tree, stratified sampling based on the response variable is used to alter the response variable's marginal distribution.
For this analysis, there were two response categories: fail or not fail. Thus, there were two strata. Stakeholders agreed on a 20 to 1 cost ratio of false negatives to false positives. The marginal distribution of the response variable was altered accordingly by disproportional stratified sampling. Failures were oversampled so, as shown below, the forecasts produced about 20 false positives for every false negative.
Nonparametric Estimation of the Response Functions
There are a variety of nonparametric procedures with which to inductively construct the empirical relationships between a set of predictors and a response. Perhaps the best known are found under the rubric of the generalized additive model (Hastie and Tibshirani, 1990) . For many applications, several machine learning procedures, such as random forests, can be more effective, especially within a forecasting context. Having a base in classification trees gets random forests off to a good start. Classification trees are known to be very responsive to associations in the data. In addition, by sampling predictors at each split, random forests provides an opportunity for a wide variety of trees to be grown. Stronger predictors do not necessarily push aside weaker predictors. This can make for more flexible model building when needed. But, classification trees are known to be very unstable. Results can change dramatically in new random samples from the same population. Random forests addresses the instability in its last step when it averages over a large number of trees. In some sense, one has the best of both worlds: a very flexible fitting procedure that is also rather stable.
Random Forests and Forecasting
Random forests reflects Leo Breiman's view that the proper empirical test of any theory is whether it forecasts well (Breiman, 2001b) . Consequently, most of the output from random forests addresses forecasting accuracy directly or builds on measures of forecasting accuracy.
Forecasting accuracy would ordinarily be addressed by constructing predictions for data that had not be used to arrive at the forecasting procedure. That is, one develops the forecasting procedure with one data set and evaluates its forecasting performance with another data set. Random forests accomplishes effectively the same thing with its OOB data. Recall that the OOB data are not used to construct a classification tree; they are held out. They can serve, therefore, as valid test data with which to evaluate forecasting accuracy. We will see, moreover, that a measure of each predictor's importance is how much it contributes to forecasting skill in the OOB data.
Results
Random forests was applied to the data. Predictors could include, at least in principle, any information available as long as it preceded the 18 month follow-up period. In practice, there is an almost limitless number of predictors that could be constructed requiring an almost limitless amount of programming. Substantive information and practical concerns led to a reasonable set of predictors identified shortly.
Racial Effects With Eleven Predictors
Recall that African-American parolees and probationers were about 5 times more likely to fail than White parolees and probationers. But race is well know to be associated with a large number of confounders. How easy is it to make any racial effects "disappear?" We start with ten covariates likely to be related to the race of an offender and the chances of being a perpetrator or a victim. For example, black offenders are more likely to be female and are more likely to have a greater number of prior arrests. The following predictors are also plausibly related to failure on probation or parole:
1. whether the current conviction offense was for an assault;
2. whether the current conviction offense was for a drug-related crime;
3. whether the current conviction was for a burglary;
4. whether the current conviction was for a gun-related crime; 5. the number of prior arrests; 6. the offender's age when supervision began; 7. the offender's sex; 8. whether the judge made a referral for drug treatment; 9. whether the judge made a referral for alcohol treatment; and 10. whether the judge made a referral for psychiatric care. Table 2 depend in part of the 20 to 1 cost ratio imposed from outside of the data. The ratio of false positives to false negatives (1276/59) is a little more than 20 to 1, which is just about on target. With a different cost ratio, Table 2 could change substantially. But in general, there will be a tradeoff between false positives and false negatives. For example, if the relative costs of false positives is increased, a smaller number of individuals will be incorrectly predicted to fail, and a larger number of individuals will be incorrectly predicted not to fail. All of the numbers in Table 2 would change accordingly. Figure 1 shows the importance of each predictor for forecasting accuracy. The labels on the left are largely self-explanatory. Importance is measured is the proportion increase in forecasting error for a given predictor, when the values of that predictor are placed in random order. More specifically, forecasting accuracy is first computed as in Table 2 . Then, forecasting accuracy is computed again, but with the values of each predictor in turn placed in random order. The random ordering makes any shuffled variable effectively uncorrelated with the response and, therefore of no help in forecasting. It follows that forecasting error will usually increase compared to the original results. The key point is that the random forests forecasting structure itself is unchanged by the shuffling. Only the prediction can change.
The most important predictor is the age at intake. When that variable is not allowed to participate in the forecasting, errors for offenders who actually failed increases from about 30% to over 60%. The increase is approximately 34 percent points. The next most important predictor is the number of prior arrests. The increase in forecasting error for offenders who actually failed is about 18 percentage points when that predictor is not allowed to participate. The forecasting performance of all the other predictors can be interpreted in a similar fashion.
The general picture is that forecasting accuracy for individuals who fail is driven primarily by age at intake, the total number of priors, and gender. The crime for which an individual is convicted and referrals by the judge matter little in addition. The importance of race falls in between. If race is not permitted to contribute to forecasting accuracy, the accuracy for those who actually fail declines by about 7 percentage points.
One might think that there should be similar declines in forecasting accuracy for probationers and parolees who did not fail. That is, the importance story from Figure 1 should replicated by increases in false positives. In fact, none of the predictors, including race, make important contribution to forecasting accuracy. The explanation is partly simple arithmetic. There are many more offenders who do not fail than do fail. Consequently, to replicate the percentage declines in Figure 1 , the raw number of forecasting errors would need to be far larger as well. And they are not.
5 Moreover, such comparisons are complicated by the majority vote rule that random forests implements. Suppose that for a given individual the vote over 500 trees is 255 to 245 in favor of failure. The votes of only 6 trees would need to change from fail to not fail for the vote to be reversed. In contrast, suppose the vote were 400 to 100 in favor of failure. Now, 151 votes would need to change from fail to not fail for the original vote to be reversed. Recall that because for these data the vast major of individuals do not fail, a forecast of no failure has a
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Figure 1: Predictor Importance Using Eleven Predictors Measured by Reductions in Forecasting Accuracy for Individuals Who Failed very good chance of being right. Consequently, the votes for no failure are far more one-sided than the votes for failure and, therefore, far more difficult to overturn. In short, there is no reason to expect the importance measures for those who fail to parallel the importance measures for those who do not fail. An obvious alternative to the shuffling method is to drop a given variable such as race from the set of predictors, recompute the random forests output, and compute predictor importance again. A new random forests forecasting structure would be the result, and insofar as the dropped predictor is related to other predictors, those other predictors will pick up the slack. So, forecasting performance will almost certainly not decline as much as the earlier measure of forecasting importance implies. In this case, when race was dropped and random forests reapplied, forecasting error for those who failed increased from .30 to .35. The other predictors did not compensate as much as one might have hoped.
One possible inference is that under either method, one risks increasing the number of false negatives by about 10. There could be 10 more failures that in principle could have been prevented. Given the seriousness of the failures, the decline in forecasting accuracy of several percentage points cannot be automatically dismissed. There are also other issues to be addressed later. An initial response, therefore, is to see whether better forecasting performance can be achieved by including more predictors. Table 3 is the confusion table that results when the number of predictors is increased from 11 to 20. As before, the labels are largely self-explanatory. One can see that forecasting accuracy has been substantially improved. Individuals who do not fail are forecasted with better than 90% accuracy. Individuals who fail are forecasted with better that 75% accuracy.
Results With Twenty Predictors
As before, race as virtually no forecasting importance for those who did not fail. And as before, none of the other predictors make much difference either. Again, the very large number of individuals who did not failed coupled with lopsided votes make it very difficult for any predictors who have much impact. Figure 2 shows the forecasting importance of the predictors for those who failed. Compared to Figure 1 , a much richer story unfolds. Intake age is still the most powerful predictor, but four new variables make the top six: (1)
Forecasting Importance of Each Predictor
Increase in Forecasting Error
Parole Case
Psychiatric Treatment
Conviction Crime Burglary
Conviction Crime Gun-Related
Conviction Crime Assault
Probation Case
Alcohol Treatment
Race
Drug Treatment
Marital Status
Conviction Crime Drug-Related
Employment Status
Less Than High School
Male
Zipcode
Suspended Sentence Length
Total Priors
Age at First Contact the number of prior juvenile arrests, (2) the age at which the individual had his or her first contact with the adult courts, (3) the length of the suspended or nominal sentence, and (4) the zipcode in which the offender lives. Early trouble with the law matters a great deal. Judges may be taking risks to public safety into account when they determine sentence length. And the neighborhood in which an offender lives is important. The forecasting importance of race for those who fail is reduced from about 7% to about 3%.
6 When race is dropped from the model and the forecasts recomputed with new random forests output, the reduction in forecasting accuracy is effectively zero. One can exclude race altogether from the forecasting and not increase aggregate forecasting error.
Unfortunately, matters are more complicated. Like for any predictor, the role of race can have two components. As noted earlier, there is part that is associated other predictors. There is another part that is unique in that it is not associated with other predictors. When race is dropped completely from the analysis, the part correlated with other predictors is spread among those other predictors. Only the unique part is removed. There is no way to determine exactly what the shared part of the race variables represents, and its effects remain. In other words, if a decision is made to remove the impact of race on the forecasts, only the unique part can be excluded. Figure 3 is a Venn diagram that can help illustrate some of the statistical forces at work. In this figure, race is associated with gender and prior record. That part of race that does not overlap with gender or prior record contributes to whatever forecasting importance race uniquely has. This is the contribution to forecasting accuracy computed by the shuffling method. The same reasoning applies to the variables gender and prior record. When race is excluded from the set of predictors to begin with, the regions that race shares with gender and prior record are folded into gender and prior record. This can increase their forecasting power and at least in part compensate for the loss of race as a predictor. Excluding race may then not matter much. However, the overlap regions with race are indicated by question marks to emphasize that they cannot be conceptually assigned to any single predictor. If race is determined to be an illegitimate predictor, only that part of race that does not overlap with other predictors is removed. The part of race that is shared with other predictors remains. The predictor zipcode raises some related questions. The way the variable is now used, it is just categorical like gender and race. Each zipcode serves as a category into which each observation is placed. The nature of each area represented by a zipcode is not unpacked. Using zipcode in this fashion maximizes its forecasting power, but has little interpretive content. Is zipcode primarily picking up household income, for instance? It may also be that zipcode effects are in part picking up the racial composition of a zipcode area, which is likely to be associated with the race of individual offenders. Is this legitimate? And is it legitimate to include zipcode as a predictor if there is unique forecasting skill derived from its racial composition?
Response Functions
The forecasting importance of a given predictor depends on the nature of its relationship with the response after conditioning on other predictors and on its distribution. It can be useful therefore, to try to unpack of role of each. To do that, we turn to partial response plots. Partial response plots also reveal how each predictor is related to the response, other predictors held constant.
For any given predictor, partial response plots display the values of that predictor against the average fitted values of the response, all other predictors fixed at their observed values. The fitted values are analogous to theŷ i in the usual regression notation so that in effect, theŷ i are being plotted against each unique x i . The technical details are beyond the scope of this paper, but accessible discussions be found in several places (e.g., Berk, 2008a: 222-231) .
To help set the stage for a consideration of race, consider first some other predictors with substantial forecasting importance. Figure 4 shows the partial response plot for age at intake. The vertical axis is in units of centered logits. Larger values (upwards) imply a greater probability of failure. Age at intake in years is the metric of the horizontal axis.
It is clear that younger individuals are at much greater risk of failure and that the risk falls off rapidly. After about age 35, further increases in age do not matter. The increase after age 50 is an artifact that results from very few observations with an intake age that old or older. The effects below age 35 are large. The metric of centered log odds implies that the odds of failure are about two times larger for an offender 20 years of age compared to an offender 35 years of age. The nature of the relationship is somewhat unexpected. Figure 4 is highly nonlinear. That risk decreases with age is certainly no surprise. But there is nothing in criminology that anticipates the details of the particular functional form shown. Figure 5 is the partial response plot for the length of the nominal sentence in months. Again, there is a highly nonlinear relationship. The risks of failure increase dramatically up to sentences of around 100 months. Beyond 100 months, risk levels off, but there are very few observations that large so the response function in that region has very little support and should not be taken seriously.
7 As before, the effects can be substantial. The odds of failure are about two times larger when the nominal sentence is 100 months compared to when the nominal sentence is a year or less although.
8 Figure 6 shows the partial response plot for the number of juvenile arrests. The story is simple. The key difference is between no arrests and any number of arrests greater than one. In this instance, a simple cutoff makes sense. Any number of juvenile arrests substantially increases the chances of failure and more is not worse than less. The odds of failure are increased a little less than two-fold. Figure 7 is the partial response plot for the age at first contact with the adult courts. Offenders whose first contact with the adult courts was at an age of less than 13 are at the very highest risk. After that, the risk drops rapidly until around age 21. Risk then levels off. An initial contact at age 22 poses no more risk than an initial contact at age 35. Then, the risk increase again, but as we have seen several times, there is very little data to support the fitted values for the largest values on the horizontal axis. The effects in Figure 7 can be bit smaller than for the earlier plots. The odds of failure for an offender whose first contact with the adult courts was at age 10 are about 1.5 times greater than for an individual whose first contract with the adult courts was at age 20.
Finally, we turn to the partial response plot for race. Recall that in the larger model, race had little forecasting importance. Its weak forecasting power can be in part be explained by how race is distributed compared to how failure is distributed. Table 1 showed that there were 198 failures and 9503 African-American offenders. Even if all of the failures were for Black individuals, the vast majority of African Americans would not have failed. Likewise, if all of the failures were for White individuals, the vast majority 7 Cases with rare values for certain predictors could have been dropped from the analysis. But that would have threatened external validity, especially because having a rare value on any given predictor does not necessarily mean having a rare value on any other predictor. Moreover, one can see in the response function plots that a few rare data points at the tails of a distribution are very unlikely to affect the functional form for other values because the fitting procedures are very flexible. In effect, the rare observations are ignored. The option of recoding the rare values for any variable to some common value (e.g., some reasonable upper bound) would risk affecting the functional form elsewhere because for that value the data would no longer be sparse.
8 The nominal or suspended sentence can be very short when judges take time served awaiting trial into account. In short, with the response being so much more out of balance than the race, it is difficult for race to have substantial forecasting power even when the other predictors are taken into account.
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In addition, the nature of the association between race and failure needs to be considered. Recall, from Table 1 that African-American offenders were about 5 times more likely to fail than White offenders. The bivariate association is strong. Does the same hold when there are 20 predictors? Figure 8 is the partial response plot for race. Race is a categorical variable, so the plot is a bar chart. But the vertical axis is the same as before. Only the results for Whites and African Americans rest on enough cases to be taken seriously.
There is not a great deal going on. The odds of failure for AfricanAmerican offenders are about 1.1 times larger than for White offenders. If one works backwards to failures per 1000, the two are quite similar. Therefore, race has little forecasting power also because its association with the response is weak. Race does not distinguish well between those who fail and those who do not beyond what the other predictors manage to accomplish.
In summary, the distributional problems just described do not preclude a strong association. The strong association between race and failure in Table 1 should make that clear. However, forecasting importance can be undermined by either distributional difficulties or the absence of a substantial association. In this instance, the forecasting importance of race is undermined by both.
Perpetrators and Victims
Forecasts also were made to distinguish between (1) perpetrators of homicide or attempted homicide, (2) victims of attempted homicide, (3) victims of homicide, and (4) none these. Forecasting accuracy fell off a bit from Table 3 in part because distinguishing between four outcome categories rather than two outcome categories made sparse data even more sparse. The main reason for doing the analysis was to determine whether offenders who were perpetrators look much the same as offenders who were victims. Forecasting 9 Consider a single classification tree. Race would need to enter at a branch in the tree where the two conditional distributions (i.e., for race and for failure) had far more similar balance than their marginal distributions. Although this certainly could happen, there nothing in the data partitioning process to help bring that about. And insofar as greater correspondence between the two distributions is unusual for any single tree, race cannot contribute much to forecasting accuracy over many trees. One key implication is that it is extremely difficult to find predictors that will distinguish between them. Thus, even through one might well want to make a conceptual distinction between perpetrators and victims, one cannot do that effectively with the predictors we have. And in that case, folding in victims of homicide or attempted homicide with individuals who are not "failures" is likely to reduce forecasting accuracy.
The similarities between perpetrators and victims underscore that interventions with the individuals forecasted to fail, may not only reduce the chances that those individuals will initiate fatal violence, but also the chances that those individuals will be victims of fatal violence. This adds more empirical content to the earlier discussion of the tradeoffs that can follow when useful predictors are discarded.
Implications for Practice
Given the forecasting results, there seem to be five options for how one might proceed with the forecasting in practice.
1. One can employ the best model, which for these data happens to include race as a predictor. This is the most technically defensible position because race seems to have at least some unique forecasting value, and the problem with effects that race shares with other predictors disappears.
2. One can drop race and recompute the forecasts from scratch. For these data, little forecasting accuracy would be lost overall, but racial effects shared with other predictors would remain. The overlap regions marked in Figure 3 are captured by all predictors correlated with race. Moreover, even though there may be little loss in forecasting accuracy in the aggregate, the forecasts for some individuals could well change compared to the forecasts from option #1.
3. One can residualize all of the predictors for race by regressing each in turn on race and computing the residuals. In this manner, the overlap regions in Figure 3 are removed from these predictors. Random forests is then applied from scratch without using race as a predictor and substituting the now overlap-free predictors for the original predictors. The forecasts would then be race neutral. But, it is likely that forecasting accuracy would decline because the overlap regions probably contain information helpful for forecasting. Moreover, one is "over-adjusting" for race because one is assuming that the overlap is really all about race. If that were true, there would be no overlap to begin with and empirically, race would be uncorrelated with all other predictors. 4. One can retain the more accurate random forests results from option #1, but assign a race at random to each offender at intake. 11 On the average, race would have no impact on the forecasts, and the content it shares with other predictor would play no role. However, whenever for a given offender's the assigned race was not the same as the actual race, there would be an increased risk of forecasting incorrectly.
5. One can retain the more accurate random forests results from option #1, but instead of assigning race at random, one could assign some acceptable constant to each offender. All forecasts would then then shifted up or down the same amount regardless of an offender's actual race. For example, if one were only concerned about Whites and Blacks, one could use the proportion Black (or White). Just as with the random assignment approach, the content that race shares with other predictors would be moot. And with respect to race, all offenders would be treated in the same fashion. However, systematic error would be introduced into the forecasts. It might well turn out, for instance, that compared to the forecasts when an offender's actual race was used, false negatives would increase for blacks and decrease for whites. Note that assigning a constant of zero is not a fundamentally different solution although at first glance, it would seem to make the impact of race "disappear."
Conclusions
On technical grounds, the first option of using the full set of predictors in their native form should be chosen. All other options lead to increases in forecasting errors and necessarily introduce additional value tradeoffs. However, if there is a clear set of tradeoffs that stakeholders favor, one of the other options might well turn out to be preferable. For example, if "overadjustments" for race do not reduce forecasting accuracy very much, the third alternative might be provide an acceptable resolution for how race should be handled.
In principle, the same issues could arise for age and gender, and the same kinds of analyses might be usefully undertaken. It is likely that substantial forecasting importance for age and gender would remain with the assortment of covariates likely to be available in any official data. Consequently, the tradeoffs discussed would probably have even more bite. The role of zipcode as a predictor also needs further consideration. In many locales, it will serve as a powerful proxy for race.
